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<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>THOMAS JOHN WOOD</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Class of 1845</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Died 2248.</strong></p>
<p>On a bright winter day on the banks of the Hudson where many a time the roll of the Class of 1845 had been called, the crash of three volleys sent its echoes through the hills, the last sad notes of Taps were sounded and for the first time in all these years the roll of 1845 was again complete. Sixty-one years before, in the full pride of youth, the members of this class had left the shades of their Alma Mater and taken up the battle of life. Soon the roll was broken; the Mexican War called for its quota and they answered "Here," inside of the enemy's lines at Molino Del Rey, Thomas J. Wood's room-mate, Frank Farry, died gallantly leading a storming party. Years rolled by and more voices were hushed, but their memories were cherished by the survivors. Who can forget Crittenden captured in one of the early attempts to free Cuba, who when ordered to kneel down before the firing party answered "A Kentuckian kneels only to his God," and met his death like a hero. Then came the greatest drama that the Class of 1845 had to face, the war between the States, and the friends of yesterday became the enemies of today and manfully fought the battle to the bitter end.</p>
<p>This is no time or place for extended notice of their work; the roll speaks for itself. William F. Smith, Fitz John Porter, Gordon Granger, Kirby Smith, Stone, Bee, Russell, all did their duty and no man did a fuller share than the subject of this memoir, Thomas John Wood. But the war was now over and again the years rolled by, one by one the old guard fell away until in 1892 when the surviving members of '45 held a dinner in New York, only six answered the roll-W. F. Smith, E. K. Smith, Porter, Hatch, Coppee and Wood. Ere another year had gone by Kirby Smith answered the last summons and one by one they passed away. Well does the writer recollect a morning several years ago when the news of the death of W. F. Smith appeared in the paper, and the remark of General Wood's: "well, I am the only one left, Baldy Smith is gone." But now on this bright winter day all is changed, once more the roll is complete, once again every member of the Class of '45 answers "Here" for the last member of the class has "crossed over the river and rests under the trees" and sleeps peacefully on the banks of the Hudson in the little cemetery at West Point.</p>
<p>Such in brief is the story of a class and of a life, now for a more complete sketch of the man. Thomas John Wood was born in Mumfordville, Hart County, Kentucky, Sept. 25, 1823. His ancestry was traced to the early settlers of Virginia and on both father's and mother's side were numbered many soldiers of the Revolutionary and Indian Wars. His father, Colonel George T. Wood, was one of the prominent men of his day in Kentucky and his mother was a sister of Gov. Charles Helm, of that state. His boyhood days were spent along Green river and he often in later days used to say that the earliest friend he could remember outside of his family was that other distinguished graduate of the Military Academy, General S. B. Buckner or "Bolivar" Buckner as he used to call him. After receiving the rather meagre schooling of the West of those days, in 1841 he received an appointment to the Military Academy from Hon. Willis Green, the member of Congress from the Hart County District. Then began his connection with West Point and the Army, never broken for 65 years. During General Wood's first year at the Academy he roomed with Cadet U. S. Grant.</p>
<p>In 1845 he graduated as one of the star men of his class and after a brief term of service at the Academy was offered his choice between his graduation leave and an assignment on General Taylor's staff in Texas. He at once accepted the latter and reported for duty to General Taylor at Corpus Christi and began his active work as a soldier. Being an honor graduate he had been assigned to the Topographical Engineers and served in that capacity with General Taylor, occupying a tent with General, at that time Lieutenant George G. Meade, also of the Topographical Engineers. The trouble with Mexico soon changed from diplomacy to war and in the spring of 1846, General Taylor advanced toward the Rio Grande, meeting the Mexican Army drawn up across his route at Palo Alto. Lieutenant Wood had been detailed by General Taylor to bring up the heavy guns from Point Isabel and it was found necessary to use oxen for that purpose, four yoke to a gun, and it was with great difficulty that the ox-guns were brought into position.</p>
<p>General Taylor in his official report says "The eighteen-pound battery, which played a conspicuous part in the action of the 8th was admirably served by Lieutenant Churchill, 3rd Artillery, assisted by Lieutenant Wood, Topographical Engineers. This engagement at Palo Alto, May 8, 1846, was Thomas J. Wood's first experience under fire and by a strange chance the first man he saw killed in action was Major Samuel Ringgold, a distinguished graduate of the Academy, who was struck down immediately in the rear of Lieutenant Wood's ox-gun battery. Then followed the Battle of Resaca de la Palma on the 9th of May and the retreat of the Mexicans across the Rio Grande, leaving Texas completely in the possession of the American Army. During the summer of 1846 General Taylor crossed to Rio Grande and advanced toward Monterey, where after three days hard fighting the Mexican Army was so surrounded that General Ampudia was forced to surrender. In this action Lieutenant Wood served on General Taylor's staff. In October 1846, Lieutenant Wood was transferred to the 2nd Dragoons and served as Adjutant to Colonel Charles May during the campaign of Buena Vista.</p>
<p>The story of this brilliant action where General Taylor with but 4,600 men successfully checked and defeated 22,000 Mexicans under Santa Anna, their ablest leader, is a familiar one to all. Suffice it to say at present that Lieutenant Wood did his full duty, making a brilliant reconnaisance and penetrating inside the Mexican lines before the action, and of his conduct during the battle Colonel May in his official report says: "to Lieutenant Thomas J. Wood, my Adjutant, my thanks are particularly due for the prompt manner in which he conveyed my orders and for the energy and zeal he displayed throughout the battle." This action was the last important event on the northern line and Lieutenant Wood remained with General Taylor's Army until after the capture of the City of Mexico when he was ordered to Vera Cruz and acted as escort to the United States Representatives which concluded the Peace of Guadelope Hidalgo with Mexico. The War with Mexico now being finished, the 2nd Dragoons were ordered to the frontier of Texas and for the next five years Lieutenant Wood was engaged in the endless task, now happily a thing of the past, of guarding the frontier.</p>
<p>Often stationed at one company post, sometimes the only officer at the post, he proved himself the same vigilant active officer in small things that the trying days of the Civil War showed him to be in great things. During part of this period he was aide-de-camp on the staff of General Harney and for several years Adjutant of the 2nd Dragoons. In 1849, he was ordered to West Point as an assistant professor but after a very brief service was relieved at his own request as he preferred duty with his regiment. The group of able men who led the Texans so successfully through their bitter fight for independence were still on the stage in Texas and Lieutenant Wood was thrown into intimate relationship with them and during his later days told stirring anecdotes of Sam Houston, Lamar, Green and many others. In 1851 he was promoted to a 1st Lieutenancy in the 2nd Dragoons and in 1854 he was sent to New York where he spent a year on recruiting service. In March 1855, two new Cavalry Regiments were added to the Army, then called the 1st and 2nd Cavalry, since changed to the 4th and 5th. Thomas J.</p>
<p>Wood was commissioned as the 2nd Captain of the 1st Cavalry and after recruiting a good part of his company in Kentucky, proceeded to Fort Leavenworth where the new regiment was to rendezvous. When the roster of this new regiment is scanned by the eyes of today it seems hard to believe that only a few brief years would tear it to fragments and find the whilom friends enemies, leading armies and corps and divisions, in place of the battalions and companies of Fort Leavenworth days, E. V. Sumner headed the roster as Colonel, Joseph E. Johnston was Lieutenant-Colonel, W. H. Emory and John Sedgwick the Majors; George B. McClellan, Delos B. Sackett, Samuel Sturgis, J. E. B. Stuart, Thomas J. Wood and many other distinguished men were the company officers. But there was as much work to be done in the Kansas frontier as there had been in Texas. The Indians were a constant menace, the Mormon question presented many difficulties and soon the struggle in Kansas itself between the pro-slavery and free soil factions gave the troops stationed on its borders many anxious hours. In all this work Capt. Wood and his troop of Cavalry took a prominent part, for in all of Thomas J.</p>
<p>Wood's military life from the day he left the Academy to the time that he went on the retired list one fact stands out pre-eminent-wherever work was to be done, the War Department always found use for him. It was never a case of "waiting orders" but always on duty with troops. During the years 1856-57, he was chiefly engaged in trying to keep peace between the two conflicting factions in Kansas. About the same time his troop escorted Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston while running the Kansas boundary and was out with the expedition six months. Several troops of the regiment were in the expedition and there was quite a rivalry between them as to which troop would lose the least number of horses. Troop "C," Capt. Wood, surpassed every other troop by not losing a horse although it required the devotion of one trooper, who led his horse, which was completely played out, for two months to make the record and frequently General Wood used to dwell with great pleasure on the devotion of Jackson, 2nd to his horse and his troop. In 1858 the 1st Cavalry took part in General A. S. Johnston's Utah expedition and in the fall of the year Capt.</p>
<p>Wood was sent with two troops to Fort Washita in the Indian Territory where he remained in command of the post until the fall of 1859 when he obtained a year's leave for travel in Europe. This might be said to end the first chapter in the life of Thomas J. Wood, fifteen years service on the frontier, constantly in the saddle, a faithful subaltern, a capable staff officer, an energetic troop commander, ready now by training and discipline for the higher commands and the graver responsibilities of the Division and Corps commander. After a very complete trip over Europe which included being present as one of the official guests at the Coronation of Charles XV. as King of Norway at the old capital of Trondhjem, January 1861, found Captain Wood in Alexandria. Here he was notified by the War Department that all leaves had been recalled and he at once hastened to the United States, arriving in New York in March. The situation was a most trying one. The Southern Confederacy had been established and two hostile sections confronted each other.</p>
<p>A Southern man by birth, Captain Wood faced the most painful and important crisis in his career but he never faltered for one moment in his duty to the Government. In all his immediate family in Kentucky, his father and he were the only Union men. Colonel George T. Wood, his father, was one of the three members of the Military Board which took charge of the raising of troops for the Union after Gov. Magoffin, of Kentucky, had cast in his allegiance with the Confederacy and through the entire war Colonel Wood was a bulwark in the Union Line in the State ot Kentucky. Captain Wood, immediately after landing in New York, went to Washington and was promoted Major in the 1st Cavalry but never joined the regiment. For a month moderate men both North and South, Major Wood among the number, endeavored to bring about some compromise that might prevent war but the last hope was dissipated when Fort Sumter was fired on. The President's first call for troops followed immediately and Major Wood was ordered to Indianapolis to muster in the quota from Indiana. In that duty Major Wood spent six busy months and mustered into the United States service over 40,000 men. Governor O. P.</p>
<p>Morton, the great War Governor of Indiana, was so much pleased with his work that when Major Wood requested to be relieved from the detail to go into the field, Governor Morton insisted that he stay and complete the quotas. In May 1861, Major Wood was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonelcy of the 1st Cavalry and on October 11, 1861, he was appointed a Brigadier-General of Volunteers, largely on the recommendation of Governor Morton and ordered into the field, his first command being a brigade at Camp Nevin, Kentucky. During General Wood's service at Indianapolis he had met Miss Greer, of Dayton, Ohio, a niece of Colonel Edward A. King, of the Army, and they were married in Dayton, Ohio, Nov. 29, 1861. The winter of 1861-62, was largely devoted to training and organizing the new troops and before the campaign of 1862 opened, General Wood was placed in command of the Sixth Division in the Army of the Ohio, then under command of General D. C. Buell. This Army had been under the command of General W. T.</p>
<p>Sherman who had been relieved by Secretary Cameron after the celebrated interview at the Galt House in Louisville when General Sherman had shown his wonderful military talent by telling the Secretary how many men it would require to finish the war and had been laughed at and called a crazy man for his prophecy. Time proved Sherman nearly right, for even the number he wanted did not prove sufficient for the task. At this celebrated interview General Thomas J. Wood accompanied General Sherman at his request as his witness and afterwards, again at General Sherman's request, wrote an account of the interview which General Sherman used in his autobiography. In the campaign of 1862, Wood's division took part in the advance on Nashville, ending in the occupation of that city. The Army of the Ohio then marched toward Pittsburg Landing to join the Army of the Tennessee. Sunday morning, April 6, '62, as Wood's division was pursuing its march the booming of cannon from the southwest brought tidings of progress of battle. The march-step was quickened. At 1 o'clock A.M.</p>
<p>an order was received to cut loose from the baggage-train and to press forward, by forced march, to the Tennessee river-the assistance of the division being needed. This was at once done, and through the Sunday afternoon the foot-sore troops pressed on. About nightfall the rain began to fall in torrents but the troops were to know no rest. The roar of artillery told that the battle was still on. All night long-through darkness, rain and mud, wading streams swollen by the rain-the division pressed forward and reached the Tennessee river shortly after daylight the morning of the 7th. The division had marched 24 hours without food or rest, and had accomplished more than 30 miles. As rapidly as steamboats could be obtained, after the arrival of the division at Savannah, the troops were embarked and hurried forward to Pittsburg Landing. The bulk of the division reached the battlefield between 12 M. and 1 P. M.</p>
<p>April 7; and though the tide of battle had, by this time, been turned in favor of the National arms, the division, after its wearisome night march, had the proud satisfaction of joining in the pursuit of the enemy, and the night of the 7th bivouacked farther to the front than any other of the National troops. The writer has often heard General Wood say that he considered the night march of his division to Shiloh most creditable as showing the willingness and devotion of both officers and enlisted men. General Wood's division took part in the advance and siege of Corinth but the troops under his command were not seriously engaged during this campaign. During the summer of 1862, an effort was made to repair and guard the Charleston and Memphis Railroad and General Wood was employed for several months in this duty, an endless undertaking as the line of the road running East and West exposed it to the raids of the numerous bands of Confederate Cavalry. In the last days of August 1862, he was however able to repay General Forrest for his summer's work by striking and scattering his Cavalry Command near McMinnville, Tenn.</p>
<p>The advance of Bragg across the Tennessee river and his subsequent march into Kentucky drew the Army of the Ohio back to the Ohio river. During this period General Wood displayed his usual vigilance, and information obtained by him through a spy, gave the Union Commander his first insight into Bragg's plans for his Kentucky campaign. But too much time had already been lost and it was impossible to save from capture the Union Garrison at Mumfordville although after his first success Bragg found the Union troops so close at his heels that he was obliged to forego his attempt on Louisville and turn into Eastern Kentucky. It is a strange coincidence that Mumfordville which General Wood tried to save from capture was his birthplace and the home of his father, who had been driven away from it at midnight by the Confederate advance. After a brief respite at Louisville to re-equip the troops General Wood's division took part in the advance against Bragg which ended in the Battle of Perryville in October 1862, and the retreat of the Confederates from Kentucky.</p>
<p>The last days of 1862, found the Army of the Cumberland advancing from Nashville confronted by its old adversary, the Confederate Army of the Tennessee and General Wood in command of his old division in the left wing of the Army. During the advance to Stone river General Wood led the left wing and his division had several brilliant skirmishes with the opposing Confederates. But Stone river marked the limit of the Confederate retreat; beyond it Bragg's Army was found drawn up in line of battle. General Wood's division was on the extreme left of the Union Line and with that vigilance which always marked him in the field he was not content with the ordinary picket line, but sent men out in front of it with orders to climb into trees and keep close watch on the Confederate Lines. Between midnight and daylight these scouts reported to him that the enemy was moving large bodies of troops from his right to his left. This information seemed so important to General Wood that he at once sent the picket officer to the Commanding General.</p>
<p>If this valuable information had been acted upon the right of the Union Army would not have been crushed by these very troops early the next morning, but one of the mysteries of war occurred, the Commanding General sent this information to the Commander of the right wing but it was never received. With dawn came the rush of the Confederates on the right, pushing it back, brigade after brigade; soon the centre was involved and doubled back until only the extreme left of the Federal Army held to its ground of the morning and this position was grasped by Wood's division. General Wood with but two brigades, Hascall and Wagner's, Harker's having been sent to the aid of the right, never faltered in his position. General Bragg in his telegram sent to Richmond the evening of the battle said: "After ten hours hard fighting have driven him from every position except his extreme left (i. e. Wood's division) where he has successfully resisted us," and General Polk in his official report says: "His extreme left (i. e. Wood's division) alone held its position.</p>
<p>It was well chosen and ably defended." About ten o'clock in the morning General Wood was struck by a minie ball in the left heel but he did not dismount from his horse or have the wound dressed until seven o'clock in the evening when the days fighting was over. A few weeks sick leave was now forced upon him by his wound but the middle of February found him again in command of his loved division. The next active service in which General Wood took part was the so-called Tullahoma Campaign and the subsequent advance to the Tennessee river during the months of July, August and September 1863. On September 5th, General Woods' division crossed the Tennessee and were the first National troops to occupy Chattanooga on September 9th. After leaving Wagner's brigade as a garrison General Wood advanced as far as Lee and Gordon's Mills where he remained until the 19th of September. The impression in the Union Army at the time was that Bragg would not hazard a battle but a reconnaissance made by Harker's Brigade under General Wood's direct command revealed the enemy in heavy force across Chickamauga Creek. The next few days were anxious ones for the force at Lee and Gordon's Mills.</p>
<p>The Union Army was still scattered and no supporting bodies near. General Wood's orders were to hold on at all hazard and if forced back defend every inch of the road to Chattanooga. But Bragg did not attack and Rosecrans concentrated his force in time for Chickamauga. About three P. M. on the 19th, General Wood, still at Lee and Gordon's Mills, received orders to support Van Cleve's right but no information was given as to where Van Cleve was stationed, but knowing that it was always safe to march to the sound of the cannon he at once led his two brigades towards the left along the Lafayette Road. But before Van Cleve was located General Wood encountered Davis's division, hard pressed and forced back by the Confederates and deeming the situation a critical one, he at once put his force in action in support of Davis and succeeded in checking and holding the Confederate advance. The fighting was in the woods and in the corn fields at close range and was of the hottest character. In leading a charge of Buell's brigade, General Wood's horse was killed.</p>
<p>The 26th Ohio in that brigade lost over two hundred men out of three hundred and twenty-five men taken into action and so many of Estep's Battery horses were killed that the pieces had to be drawn out of action by the men. With this bitter fighting the action on the extreme right ceased and the men rested on their arms for the battle that the morning was sure to bring. During the night there were many changes in the Union Line and when completed General Wood's division was placed on the right of Brannan with Davis and Sheridan's division on his right. Up to eleven o'clock General Wood had not been seriously engaged although there had been severe fighting on the extreme left. At this time General Wood received the following order: "Headquarters D.C., Sept. 20th, 10:45 A. M. Brigadier-General Wood, Commanding Division: The General commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him. Respectfully, etc., FRANK J. BOND, Major and A. D.C." A simple order but around it has sprung up controversies innumerable, until it has become as famous as the celebrated 4:30 order of the 2nd Bull Run Campaign.</p>
<p>General Rosecrans, who issued the order, bitterly censured General Wood for obeying it and for forty years the conflict has gone on. Some years ago General Wood wrote a statement of his position and in justice to him the following extracts are given. "During the month of October, ultimo, there appeared in the New York Tribune a communication from General Rosecrans. The ostensible object of the communication appears to be to inform the public what were the relations between himself and the lamented President Garfield, while the latter was his Chief of Staff and to settle the question as to who wrote his (General Rosecrans) orders. I say the apparent purpose was to settle the relations with his late Chief of Staff but it seems doubtful whether this is the real object of the communication, since General Rosecrans has gone out of his way in the communication to make a most unwarranted attack on me.</p>
<p>To refute General Rosecrans unwarranted and unnecessary attack on myself, I will give you a copy of the paragraph in which it occurs: "When Thomas sent to ask that Brannan's division should be sent to his assistance, I directed his Aide to tell General Thomas that Negley's division was already on its way to him; that Brannan's should follow; to hold his ground at all hazards, and, if necessary, I would support him with the rest of the Army. Then, directing his Aide to go to General Brannan, whose division had only one brigade on the line between Reynolds' and Wood's, I told Major Bond to order Wood to close on Reynolds and support him. This was the order said to have been so indefinitely worded as to have opened the fatal gap in our lines. A few more words as to the sequel of these simultaneous orders will show whence arose the pretence of ambiguity in Wood's order, which was hatched into life by the War Department, as one of the many calumnies which it foisted into history; and how the fatal gap was opened in the Union lines in lieu of which Wood's division was to have closed had Brannan withdrawn his brigade from the space between Wood and Reynolds.</p>
<p>When Brannan received his orders to withdraw, finding the enemy opening the attack on his front, like a capable commander, he sent to report the fact to General Thomas, asking, if under these circumstances, he should still withdraw, and was answered, 'by no means.' When Wood received the above order the enemy's attack was also opening on his front, but instead of sending to me, in plain view, not 600 yards off, to report this fact, or to General Brannan to inquire why his troops still held the ground which Wood was to close over and touch Reynolds, he withdrew his entire division from the line, marching round behind Brannan, to the rear of Reynolds', and out of action, and thus opened the fatal gap in the Union lines which General Jeff. C. Davis, with soldierly instinct, having only two brigades, attempted to close, but was too light for his work." The foregoing extract embraces the part of General Rosecrans' communication which refers to me and I state that it is incorrect in every particular. It is proper to observe, (the italics in it are mine), which I have made to call special attention to its statements, implications and insinuations.</p>
<p>I will now demonstrate the truthfulness of this characterization of the extract from General Roscrans' communication to the Tribune. Before doing so a few words of explanation are necessary to a proper understanding of this historical and military question. Between midnight and daylight of the 20th September 1863, my division was moved from the ground on which it had fought during the afternoon of the 19th as far as a mile to the westward and northward. After this movement, and after the men had rested a brief space, I had the division aroused, and orders were given for the men to get their breakfast. After the sun arose a dense fog hung over the ground, covering everything with obscurity. As the sun descended and the fog became dissipated a staff officer came to me-I think the officer belonged to General Rosecrans' staff-and said I was to move my division to the front on the new line of battle, and occupy the position then held by General Negley's division, which was to be withdrawn to take a position elsewhere.</p>
<p>Learning as well as I could (and I was impressed with his ignorance of the position of General Negley's division) where General Negley's division was, I moved my division into the new line of battle to relieve General Negley's division. In making this movement I encountered General Rosecrans and his numerous staff. When I met General Rosecrans, as I was making this movement, the only orders he gave me were to relieve Negley's division in the line of battle, and to firmly connect my left with Brannan's right. No information was given as to the position of the other divisions in the line of battle. So anxious did General Rosecrans seem to be that my left should connect with General Brannan's right, he sent to me several times after I had gone into position to inquire whether I had firm connection with Brannan, and to insure this connection I stationed a staff officer at Brannan's right to see it was preserved. And here I will inquire whether, if General Rosecrans knew at any time of anything to break this connection, was it not his indisputable duty to inform me of it?</p>
<p>Returning to the staff officer stationed to preserve the connection with Brannan's division, I will say that he never informed me of any movement of Brannan out of line or any hint of it. Such was the position of my division, with my left finally connected with General Brannan's right, when I received an order-a true copy of which I will give in the course of this narrative. But here it is proper to refute one of General Rosecrans' statements. He says at the time I received this order, the attack was opening on my front. General Emerson Opdycke, then Colonel One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio, on the line of battle at the time the movement was made, says, in a reply to General Rosecrans' statement: "It is an utter perversion of historic truth. For more than an hour before the movement commenced not a rebel had been seen on our front." Colonel M. P. Bestow, the Adjutant-General of my division, has written me, since the appearance of General Rosecrans' letter, that his statement that my division was engaged at the time the order was received is absolutely incorrect.</p>
<p>He says no enemy had been seen for an hour, and "that we were dismounted, sitting on the ground waiting for events." I hold a letter from Captain Cullen Bradley, Chief of Artillery of my division, written also since the appearance of General Rosecrans' communication, corroborating most fully the statements of General Opdycke and Colonel Bestow. These gallant officers, whose courage was signalized on many battlefields, were immediately with my division and know whether it was engaged when the movement was made. They say, without qualification, it was not. With the refutation of General Rosecrans' accusation that my division was engaged with the enemy when the order to support Reynolds was received, the gravemen of the accusation, and indeed, of the whole controversy, falls to the ground, and I would, perhaps, be fully justified in taking no further notice of General Rosecrans and his incorrect statements. But I do not intend to do this. I intend to refute these statements in full. I. General Rosecrans says that Brannan had but one brigade in line at the time I was ordered to support Reynold's.</p>
<p>General Brannan says, in his official report, furnished me by the War Department since the appearance of General Rosecrans' October letter, that he had two brigades in line. It might be suggested that this was simply an inadvertance in General Rosecrans. If so, the just criticism is, one so careless in giving historical facts is hardly worthy of credence. But the truth is this statement was made for an important purpose. It was done to insinuate adroitly that there was only a short gap between my position and that of General Reynolds which I could possibly see across and readily bridge over. But he fails utterly to tell the reader that the position was in a dense wood, in which no one could see more than a hundred yards in any direction, and that he had wholly failed to inform me, when I relieved Negley's division or in the order to support Reynolds, that his division was the next in line to General Brannan's. 2. General Roscrans says at the time I received the order he was in plain view, not 600 yards off. He might have been only 600 yards off for all that I knew then, or know <span style="text-align: justify; font-size: 12pt;">now, for the matter of that, but that he was in plain view is absolutely incorrect. We were in a dense wood which prevented our seeing a hundred yards in any direction. But does not General Rosecrans give away his whole case as to the charge against the War Department of hatching up a conspiracy against him on the ground of the ambiguity of the order, when he suggests that I ought to have referred it back to him? And does not this suggestion put General Rosecrans in an awkward position. Think of the commander of a great army, engaged in a great battle for life and death, attempting to shield himself from his blunders by suggesting that his orders should be referred back to him for explanation.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">3. General Rosecrans does not directly say that I was informed that General Brannan had been ordered to withdraw from his position on my left but he most deftly tries to produce this impression; else why does he say "Why did he not send to inquire of Brannan why his troops still held the ground which Wood was to close over and touch Reynolds?" If this statement has any force at all it must rest on the assumption that I was informed that Brannan had been ordered to withdraw from the line of battle. I was not informed that Brannan had been ordered to withdraw from my left; hence why should I send to ask "Why his troops still held the ground" or "refer my orders back to General Rosecrans for interpretation." But there is more than a reasonable suspicion that the whole story of Brannan being ordered to withdraw from his position is an entire mistake.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I respectfully submit the following propositions for the consideration of every intelligent man.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">First. If so important a matter as the reception of a very important order by a subordinate had occurred, and he had felt he should not obey it, and had referred it back to the authority giving it, is it not reasonable to suppose some reference to such an event would be found in the official report of such subordinate commander? I think that every intelligent and impartial man will answer this question affirmatively.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Second. If the report of the subordinate commander contains no reference to any such transaction, is not the conclusion more than probable that no such occurrence ever happened?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A close reading of General Brannan's official report of the participation of his division in the Battle of Chickamauga fails to disclose any reference whatever to any order to withdraw from the line of battle.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Having refuted General Roscrans' preliminary statements, I am brought face to face to consider the momentous and central question of, first, what did General Roscrans' order to me direct and require; and, second, what was my duty under the order, in the circumstances in which I was placed when I received the order? I recall to mind-first, I was not engaged with the enemy when the order to support Reynolds was received; second, there was no intimation that Brannan had been ordered to withdraw from the line of battle-no intimation that Reynolds was next to Brannan. So situated, with not a hostile gun being fired on my front, I received the following order:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Headquarters, Sept. 20, 10:45 A. M. Brig-Gen. Wood, Commanding Division, etc: The General commanding directs that you close upon Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him. FRANK S. BOND, Major and A. D. C.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It was addressed "Brigadier-General Wood, Commanding Division" "Gallop." The "gallop" was a direction to the orderly, or staff officer, bringing the order that he was to proceed expeditiously.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Recalling to mind all the circumstances of the situation, my first impulse, on the receipt of the order, was: this order requires a hazardous movement to be made, no less than the opening of the line of battle in the presence of the enemy; but these occurred to me: first, the commanding General knows this as well as I do, and he will provide for it by ordering troops in reserve to supply my place; second, there was a precedent for the movement that I was then ordered to make in the withdrawal of Negley's division and its replacement by mine at an earlier hour of the day; third, I most honestly believed a great crisis in the battle had arrived on another and distant part of the field of battle, to stem which my division was required, and hence I was ordered to go to meet it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With these convictions controlling, I received the order to support General Reynolds; and to carry out the order to support him, I made the only movement that was possible to execute the order. Reynolds being distant from my position, and his position being unknown to me, and being ordered to support him, how was I to do it except by going to seek him? I challenge the most astute intellect to do the thing other than I did it. And I now state most explicitly that, in moving my division as I did, I supposed and believed I was doing exactly what the order required me and what General Rosecrans desired me to do. Whoever may have considered the order ambiguous, I certainly never did. When it was put into my hands by the orderly who brought it to me and read by me, its meaning was clear and undoubted. It clearly told me that I was to withdraw my division from the line, and, passing northward and eastward immediately in rear of the line of battle (and in doing this I was not at any time one hundred yards from the line of battle,) to find General Reynolds' position, to close upon him and support him. This was the construction I was forced, by the order itself and the circumstances of the situation, to place on the order; and I will frankly add that eighteen years of sober reflection and calm retrospect have simply confirmed the conviction that I not only placed the right but the only possible construction on the order.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To rightly understand what it was my duty to do when I received the order, two important factors as controlling my decision must be constantly borne in mind, viz, first my division at the receipt of the order, was not engaged with the enemy; the incessant roar of battle coming from the left told in unmistakable terms that our troops in that direction were heavily engaged, and had been for two hours and a half. Suppose that Reynolds had needed support-and the order clearly indicated that he did-and I had neglected to move to his support as ordered, and by reason of my failing to do so disaster had fallen on his division, and through it on the army, I ask, in all earnestness, what defense could I have offered for neglecting to go to his support, as the order so clearly directed me to do. No punishment would have been too severe for me had I failed to do so. Further, the very wording of the order indicated the movement I was to make. To close upon is the movement, in tactics, of one body in rear of another in front of it. To close to the right or left on another body of troops is another and entirely different movement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Having gone so far in the examination of historical facts, and fully prepared by the way, I am brought, face to face, with General Rosecrans' charge that, by the movement I made, under his imperative order, I moved my division out of action. This is absolutely incorrect. As already stated, in making this movement I was not a hundred yards from the line of battle. To execute the movement I drew my division just as far back-no further than was necessary-to enable it to pass just in rear of the line of battle in its course to seek Reynolds and support him, as I was ordered to do.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In doing this I ran across that grand old soldier, and still nobler gentleman, George H. Thomas. On meeting him, I asked him where Reynolds was to be found. He replied; "You are right in rear of him," and added, "Why do you Wish to find him?" I exhibited to him the order I was moving under. He at once said: "Reynolds is doing well enough; if you have anything to spare, give it to Baird, who holds the extreme left and is hard pressed." I replied; "Will you take the responsibility of changing General Rosecrans' order?" He said he would. I then asked him to give me an aide-de-camp to conduct me to the support of Baird. My recollection is that he designated Major Willard, now a Paymaster in the Army, as the staff officer to conduct me to Baird's position. Going with Willard to the head of the division, I put him in charge of the brigade commanded by that noble, patient, and true soldier, Sydney Barnes, of Kentucky, and told him to lead it to the support of Baird on the extreme left of our line. This being done, I went to the two succeeding brigades to conduct them in the same direction. When I arrived at their head. I found the space in rear of them swarming with rebels. With this situation there was no time for deliberation. I immediately faced the two brigades to the rear, and with a part of them charged the rebels with fixed bayonets, drove them back, and held them in check till a new line of battle, in the form of a crotchet or retired wing, could be formed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">(General Wood always felt that this advance of his in the neighborhood of the Dyerfield, which temporarily checked the successful onslaught of the Confederates, was of the greatest importance as without it the Confederates would have taken our centre and left in rear and reverse and won a crowning victory.)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This new line consisted of Reynolds' steady division on the left, my two brigades in the centre and the two brigades of the gallant Brannan on the right, prolonged at a critical moment in the afternoon by the arrival of General Steedman with two brigades of his division. Here, amid a crescent of flame, the direct attacks of the left wing of the Rebel Army were successfully resisted all through that September afternoon by the troops holding the new line. This magnificent defense was witnessed by Thomas, the Rock of Chickamauga, and Garfield, who left his chief to come to the field where the fight was on.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">(General Garfield said afterwards that when he rode up to the rear of Wood's line, he found General Wood dismounted and was about to follow his example when General Wood stopped him and advised him to stay on his horse, saying: "the men are holding their own and I hope they will, but they may break and if they do, you had better be mounted." This was typical of Thomas J. Wood, the soldier, he was on foot to encourage his men and to show them that he was with them to the last but he could think of his friend-and advise him to stay on his horse. He was struck twice during the afternoon but forunately neither bullet inflicted any severe injury.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">If General Rosecrans' statement that I took my division "out of action" means that I took it where it was not useful in any further action, it is entirely incorrect.)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The above extracts are taken from an article written by General Wood in answer to one by General Rosecrans, criticizing his actions at Chickamauga, and in concluding the article General Wood gives in full, communications from General Gordon Granger and General Rosecrans himself to the War Department, both written shortly after the battle, recommending his promotion for his conduct at Chickamauga. He also cites the action of the board composed of Generals Sherman, Meade and Thomas which recommended his brevet as a Brigadier-General, U.S.A., for gallant and meritorious conduct at the Battle of Chickamauga.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When night fell, Wood's division held its position unshaken and Snodgrass Hill was given up, not because the men were beaten, but in obedience to orders to retreat given by General Rosecrans in Chattanooga.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The investment of Chattanooga followed, and General Rosecrans was relieved from command and General Thomas succeeded him and the old 20th and 21st Corps were consolidated into the 4th, thus reducing the number of higher commands, but General Wood was retained, and given the command of the 3rd Division, 4th Army Corps.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">November 23, 1863, found the united National Army under the command of General Grant confronting Bragg's forces at Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Grant's original plan of battle provided that the main attack should be made by General Sherman against the Confederate right near Tunnel Hill, sweeping the ridge and taking the enemy's intrenchments, both at its base and on its crest, in flank and rear. Difficulties encountered in passing the river delayed General Sherman from making the attack on the 20th, the original day set, and the 23rd still found him not in position for attacking. Under the circumstances General Wood was ordered to practically make a reconnaissance in force against the Confederate lines on Orchard Knob. Advancing rapidly from Fort Wood the lines swept over the low ground and soon the reconnaissance became an attack and with a gallant dash the division carried Orchard Knob and captured many of its defenders.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Wood from Orchard Knob immediately signalled General Thomas who was standing in the parapet of Fort Wood, "I have carried the first line of rebel works," to which General Thomas replied: "hold on, don't come back; you have gained too much; intrench your position."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This movement which ended in unexpected success was of the greatest importance in the later events of the campaign, as it was from the front of Orchard Knob that the divisions started which broke the Confederate centre on the 25th. In addition Walker's division was withdrawn from Lookout Mountain to Missionary Ridge to re-enforce the centre and thus Hooker's attack of the next day met with that much less resistance. Orchard Knob also became General Grant's headquarters during the remaining days of the fighting at Chattanooga.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On November 24th General Hooker carried Lookout Mountain and drove the Confederates back onto Missionary Ridge.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The 25th found General Sherman in position and the attempt was made to roll up the Confederate right, but in vain, no progress was made. The repeated assaults were seen by the officers grouped on Orchard Knob and between two and three o'clock in the afternoon it was apparent that no progress was being made.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As the events which followed immediately after are much mooted, a short extract written by General Wood himself is of importance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in .5in 8.0pt .5in;">"At the moment when it became evident General Sherman was making no progress I chanced to be standing near General Grant. He turned to me and remarked in substance, 'General Sherman is meeting with very heavy opposition, and we must do something for his relief.' I replied: 'it seems he is being roughly handled, and we ought to do all we can to aid him.' General Grant then went on to say: 'I think if we advance and take the rifle-pits opposite our front at the base of Missionary Ridge, the movement will so menace Bragg's centre on the crest that he will withdraw force enough from Sherman's front to permit him to carry his point of attack.' To this I simply expressed coincidence of opinion, and added my confidence that we could readily carry the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Doubtless this brief colloquy was the result, in chief part, of the mere accident of my standing near to General Grant at the moment, when all observers on Orchard Knob perceived that General Sherman was, to say the least, making no progress. The conversation may have been induced, in part, by the freedom of intercourse due to a long acquaintance, which had its origin when General Grant and myself were cadets at the Military Academy. These suggestions seem to be necessary to prevent the slightest suspicion that I would convey the impression that General Grant formally consulted me or desired my opinion touching any movement of troops he chose to order.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The incident of the convesation is, however, most interesting, in a historical point of view, as showing most clearly and most accurately what movement, and the purpose thereof, General Grant desired to have made by the centre of the Army of the Cumberland at that particular hour of the 25th. It further shows conclusively that an assault on the crest of Missionary Ridge was not intended to be a part of that particular movement, however much General Grant may have intended that such an assault should be subsequently made.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The incident of this conversation possesses a further historic interest and importance. Historians have called the movement ordered by General Grant against the Confederate intrenchments at the base of Missionary Ridge a radical departure from his original and admirably conceived plan of battle. It is respectfully suggested that the conversation demonstrates conclusively that the effort to carry the Confederate rifle-pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, so far from being a radical departure from the original plan of battle, was intended to be simply auxilliary to the dominant and ruling attack of the original plan. As has been more than once remarked in the course of this paper, the plan of battle was admirable. General Grant had wisely intrusted the execution of the dominant attack to his ablest, most brilliant, most distinguished, and by far most highly trusted Lieutenant, General Sherman; and he clung to his original plan with the unyielding tenacity of purpose for which he is so justly proverbial. Every consideration influenced and swayed him to this course. If his original plan could be successfully executed the result would be probably more prolific than could possibly be realized from any other issue of events. Professional pride must naturally and not improperly have urged General Grant to adhere to his original plan of battle. Regard for the fame and feelings of the trusted subordinates-yes, more than his trusted subordinate, his Fidus Achates-to whom he had committed the execution of the ruling feature of his plan of battle, solicited in the most urgent terms that no stone should be left unturned which would inure to the success of the original plan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the matchless "Psalm of Life" we are eloquently urged to</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">"Be not like dumb driven cattle,"</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">by the current of events.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With the usual license assumed and in fact allowed to poets, this advice is all very well, but it is modestly suggested that in the prosiac affairs of every-day practical life-more especially in the stern dealings of military life, the poet's counsel won't work. Events are wont to be stronger than any man's tenacity of purpose-however tenacious and persistent that may be. "L'homme propose, et Dieu dispose." The manner in which the event was finally decided at Missionary Ridge was no exception to the rule contained in the old French saw. The Commanding General willed to decide the issue in one way-the rank and file decided the issue in another and entirely different way.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The brief conversation given above scarcely occupied a minute. General Grant walked directly from me to General Thomas, who was standing a few paces distant, and a short talk occurred between them. I was not standing sufficiently near to hear what passed between them, but of course was satisfied they were conversing about the movement against the Confederate intrenchments at the base of the ridge, or perhaps I should more properly write, General Grant was communicating to General Thomas his desire to have the movement made.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Thomas called General Granger, commanding the Fourth Corps to him and gave him some directions. General Granger came immediately to me and said substantially, "we are ordered by General Grant to take the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge, and there halt. Get your division ready to move as soon as you can." He added, "I will send the order to General Sheridan, and the two divisions will move together."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Rapidly the divisions moved forward, and with a resistless sweep carried the intrenchments at the foot of the ridge. With the goal attained, the orders under which the men were acting were carried out to the letter.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Then followed perhaps the grandest display of daring enthusiasm to be found in the pages of the Civil War. Without orders the men took the initiative and pressed on up the hill. They were thinking soldiers, those Americans; they could not stay at the bottom of the ridge under the fire of fifty cannon, they would not go back and the only alternative was to advance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Back on Orchard Knob this advance was seen with surprise and General Grant turned to General Thomas and asked if he had ordered the advance to the crest and on his answering in the negative, the same question was asked of General Granger, the corps commander and the same answer elicited. Then General Joseph Fullerton, General Granger's chief of staff, was sent to Generals Wood and Sheridan to find out if they had ordered the assault on the crest of the ridge and General Wood's answer was that the men had started up without orders and that he would like to know who could stop them, but further said that if they were supported they could carry the ridge.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">His prophecy soon came true. Nearer and nearer the crest climbed the line in blue, but no more a line-a series of angles, each angle marked by the battle-flag of a regiment carried by the strongest men, for each one was striving to be the first to plant its colors in the Confederate lines. Almost simultaneously the ridge was gained at half a dozen points and the soldiers' assault of Missionary ridge became one of the marvels of the war. General Wood always claimed that the troops of his division were the first to gain the crest of the ridge, basing his assertion on the fact that while Sheridan's division was halted at the foot of the ridge and that part of it which had started up the ridge was recalled, his (i. e. Wood's) division never stopped its advance from the time it left Orchard Knob until the crest was gained. Testimony from the enemy who takes no interest in his adversary's contention is therefore valuable and the Confederate reports confirm General Wood's claim.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Bragg reported that the first break occurred in the left of Anderson's division which opposed Willich's and Hazen's brigades of Wood's division. General Bate, whose division confronted Sheridan's in his official report says that the Confederate line was first pierced in Anderson's division and that he sent re-inforcements to this point, having checked the attack on his front, i. e. Sheridan's division. Along the magnificent crest road laid out by the Government on Missionary Ridge are scattered tablets and markers representing both National and Confederate organizations. Between the two guns which indicate the position of Garrity's Alabama Battery is the battery tablet on which, recounting the services of the battery is said: "this was the first point in the line carried by the enemy." This is the Confederate testimony and the interesting question at once arises, what National troops were engaged at this point?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Many northern states have erected markers along the Crest Road to indicate the positions where their different regiments made the ascent of the ridge and these markers answer the question asked above.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Twenty feet on one side of the Alabama Battery we find the tablet showing where the 49th Ohio gained the crest, thirty feet on the other side stands the stone marker of the 89th Illinois, just beyond the bronze tablet of the 15th Ohio and but a short distance away Kansas has erected a handsome monument to her 8th regiment, all these regiments being on the right of Willich's brigade, Wood's division.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Confederates have answered this long mooted question, the men of the right of Willich's brigade and of the left of Hazen's brigade, both belonging to Wood's division, first gained the crest of Missionary Ridge.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The following brief extract from an account written at the time gives some little idea of the enthusiasm of both officers and men.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in .5in 8.0pt .5in;">"It was near sundown when General T. J. Wood, whose conduct all through the three day's battle, marked him as one of the ablest leaders of the National Armies, rode along the lines of his superb division. Loud shouts of enthusiasm everywhere greeted his appearance, until at last his feelings, no longer controllable, broke forth in a speech.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in .5in 8.0pt .5in;">"Brave men!" said he, "you were ordered to go forward and take the rebel rifle-pits at the foot of these hills; you did so; and by the Eternal! without orders, you pushed forward and took all the enemy's works on top! Here is a fine chance for having you all court martialed, and I myself will appear as the principal witness against you, unless you promise me one thing."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">"What is it? What is it?" Laughingly inquired the men.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in .5in 8.0pt .5in;">"It is," resumed the General, "that as you are now in possession of these works, you will continue, against all opposition of Bragg, Johnston, Jeff. Davis and the devil, steadfastly to hold them!"</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At the conclusion of this speech, the enthusiasm of the soldiers knew no bounds; they left the ranks and crowded around the General. "We promise! We promise!" They cried; and amid such exclamations as: "Of course we'll hold them!" "Let any try to take them from us!" "Bully for you!" "Three cheers for old Wood!" the gallant officer rode off the field.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Grant's hands being freed by the victory of Missionary Ridge, he at once sent a force into Eastern Tennessee to the relief of Knoxville which was beleagured by Longstreet. The movement was successful and Longstreet fell back without seriously opposing the relief column. General Wood's division took part in the movement and while no opportunity was given him to show his fighting ability, still he displayed to the utmost his ability to take care of his troops. The weather was terrific in Eastern Tennessee, the troops bivouacing with the thermometer 10 degrees below zero and supplies of all kinds were short. Wood's division was so well supplied that another prominent division commander tried to have an order issued from Corps Headquarters directing General Wood to give him shoes. It is needless to say that the order was not issued.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">May, '64, marked the beginning of the great campaigns East and West that were to finally crush the Rebellion and the opening of the campaign found General Wood in command of the 3rd Division, 4th Army Corps.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is impossible to give a detailed statement of the work done by General Wood's division during the long battle summer of 1864; a brief synopsis must therefore suffice.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the opening manoeuvres of the campaign in the neighborhood of Dalton, where the Confederate Army was nearly cut off, General Wood was engaged in the action at Rocky Face Ridge.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the next stage of the campaign his division took part in the Battles of Resaca, May 14-15, and action at Adairsville on May 17th.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">After being engaged in the Battle of New Hope Church, May 25-26, General Wood's division was ordered to find the extreme right of the enemy's position, turn it and attack him in flank. In the dense woods of Northern Georgia this was no easy task and it was 4:30 P. M. before the enemy could be located and the column formed for the attack. General Wood had made a personal reconnaissance of the possition and protested against the assault, stating that it could not succeed, but his protest was over-ruled and he at once ordered his brigade commanders to "go in like the D--- was after you." The result proved the wisdom of General Wood's protest. Charge after charge was made, at one point the troops reaching the line of Confederate intrenchments, but all in vain; inside of two hours 1457 men had been killed and wounded in this one division.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Wood also took part in the various engagements about Pine and Kenesaw Mountains and was in support of the attacking column in the assault on Kenesaw on June 27th, but the complete failure of the leading division in the assault prevented his being heavily engaged.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On July 19th, General Wood's division by a very brilliant movement forced the crossing of Peach Tree Creek and threw a bridge across the stream in the presence of the enemy. </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">; but these occurred to me: first, the commanding General knows this as well as I do, and he will provide for it by ordering troops in reserve to supply my place; second, there was a precedent for the movement that I was then ordered to make in the withdrawal of Negley's division and its replacement by mine at an earlier hour of the day; third, I most honestly believed a great crisis in the battle had arrived on another and distant part of the field of battle, to stem which my division was required, and hence I was ordered to go to meet it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With these convictions controlling, I received the order to support General Reynolds; and to carry out the order to support him, I made the only movement that was possible to execute the order. Reynolds being distant from my position, and his position being unknown to me, and being ordered to support him, how was I to do it except by going to seek him? I challenge the most astute intellect to do the thing other than I did it. And I now state most explicitly that, in moving my division as I did, I supposed and believed I was doing exactly what the order required me and what General Rosecrans desired me to do. Whoever may have considered the order ambiguous, I certainly never did. When it was put into my hands by the orderly who brought it to me and read by me, its meaning was clear and undoubted. It clearly told me that I was to withdraw my division from the line, and, passing northward and eastward immediately in rear of the line of battle (and in doing this I was not at any time one hundred yards from the line of battle,) to find General Reynolds' position, to close upon him and support him. This was the construction I was forced, by the order itself and the circumstances of the situation, to place on the order; and I will frankly add that eighteen years of sober reflection and calm retrospect have simply confirmed the conviction that I not only placed the right but the only possible construction on the order.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To rightly understand what it was my duty to do when I received the order, two important factors as controlling my decision must be constantly borne in mind, viz, first my division at the receipt of the order, was not engaged with the enemy; the incessant roar of battle coming from the left told in unmistakable terms that our troops in that direction were heavily engaged, and had been for two hours and a half. Suppose that Reynolds had needed support-and the order clearly indicated that he did-and I had neglected to move to his support as ordered, and by reason of my failing to do so disaster had fallen on his division, and through it on the army, I ask, in all earnestness, what defense could I have offered for neglecting to go to his support, as the order so clearly directed me to do. No punishment would have been too severe for me had I failed to do so. Further, the very wording of the order indicated the movement I was to make. To close upon is the movement, in tactics, of one body in rear of another in front of it. To close to the right or left on another body of troops is another and entirely different movement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Having gone so far in the examination of historical facts, and fully prepared by the way, I am brought, face to face, with General Rosecrans' charge that, by the movement I made, under his imperative order, I moved my division out of action. This is absolutely incorrect. As already stated, in making this movement I was not a hundred yards from the line of battle. To execute the movement I drew my division just as far back-no further than was necessary-to enable it to pass just in rear of the line of battle in its course to seek Reynolds and support him, as I was ordered to do.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In doing this I ran across that grand old soldier, and still nobler gentleman, George H. Thomas. On meeting him, I asked him where Reynolds was to be found. He replied; "You are right in rear of him," and added, "Why do you Wish to find him?" I exhibited to him the order I was moving under. He at once said: "Reynolds is doing well enough; if you have anything to spare, give it to Baird, who holds the extreme left and is hard pressed." I replied; "Will you take the responsibility of changing General Rosecrans' order?" He said he would. I then asked him to give me an aide-de-camp to conduct me to the support of Baird. My recollection is that he designated Major Willard, now a Paymaster in the Army, as the staff officer to conduct me to Baird's position. Going with Willard to the head of the division, I put him in charge of the brigade commanded by that noble, patient, and true soldier, Sydney Barnes, of Kentucky, and told him to lead it to the support of Baird on the extreme left of our line. This being done, I went to the two succeeding brigades to conduct them in the same direction. When I arrived at their head. I found the space in rear of them swarming with rebels. With this situation there was no time for deliberation. I immediately faced the two brigades to the rear, and with a part of them charged the rebels with fixed bayonets, drove them back, and held them in check till a new line of battle, in the form of a crotchet or retired wing, could be formed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">(General Wood always felt that this advance of his in the neighborhood of the Dyerfield, which temporarily checked the successful onslaught of the Confederates, was of the greatest importance as without it the Confederates would have taken our centre and left in rear and reverse and won a crowning victory.)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This new line consisted of Reynolds' steady division on the left, my two brigades in the centre and the two brigades of the gallant Brannan on the right, prolonged at a critical moment in the afternoon by the arrival of General Steedman with two brigades of his division. Here, amid a crescent of flame, the direct attacks of the left wing of the Rebel Army were successfully resisted all through that September afternoon by the troops holding the new line. This magnificent defense was witnessed by Thomas, the Rock of Chickamauga, and Garfield, who left his chief to come to the field where the fight was on.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">(General Garfield said afterwards that when he rode up to the rear of Wood's line, he found General Wood dismounted and was about to follow his example when General Wood stopped him and advised him to stay on his horse, saying: "the men are holding their own and I hope they will, but they may break and if they do, you had better be mounted." This was typical of Thomas J. Wood, the soldier, he was on foot to encourage his men and to show them that he was with them to the last but he could think of his friend-and advise him to stay on his horse. He was struck twice during the afternoon but forunately neither bullet inflicted any severe injury.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">If General Rosecrans' statement that I took my division "out of action" means that I took it where it was not useful in any further action, it is entirely incorrect.)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The above extracts are taken from an article written by General Wood in answer to one by General Rosecrans, criticizing his actions at Chickamauga, and in concluding the article General Wood gives in full, communications from General Gordon Granger and General Rosecrans himself to the War Department, both written shortly after the battle, recommending his promotion for his conduct at Chickamauga. He also cites the action of the board composed of Generals Sherman, Meade and Thomas which recommended his brevet as a Brigadier-General, U.S.A., for gallant and meritorious conduct at the Battle of Chickamauga.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When night fell, Wood's division held its position unshaken and Snodgrass Hill was given up, not because the men were beaten, but in obedience to orders to retreat given by General Rosecrans in Chattanooga.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The investment of Chattanooga followed, and General Rosecrans was relieved from command and General Thomas succeeded him and the old 20th and 21st Corps were consolidated into the 4th, thus reducing the number of higher commands, but General Wood was retained, and given the command of the 3rd Division, 4th Army Corps.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">November 23, 1863, found the united National Army under the command of General Grant confronting Bragg's forces at Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Grant's original plan of battle provided that the main attack should be made by General Sherman against the Confederate right near Tunnel Hill, sweeping the ridge and taking the enemy's intrenchments, both at its base and on its crest, in flank and rear. Difficulties encountered in passing the river delayed General Sherman from making the attack on the 20th, the original day set, and the 23rd still found him not in position for attacking. Under the circumstances General Wood was ordered to practically make a reconnaissance in force against the Confederate lines on Orchard Knob. Advancing rapidly from Fort Wood the lines swept over the low ground and soon the reconnaissance became an attack and with a gallant dash the division carried Orchard Knob and captured many of its defenders.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Wood from Orchard Knob immediately signalled General Thomas who was standing in the parapet of Fort Wood, "I have carried the first line of rebel works," to which General Thomas replied: "hold on, don't come back; you have gained too much; intrench your position."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This movement which ended in unexpected success was of the greatest importance in the later events of the campaign, as it was from the front of Orchard Knob that the divisions started which broke the Confederate centre on the 25th. In addition Walker's division was withdrawn from Lookout Mountain to Missionary Ridge to re-enforce the centre and thus Hooker's attack of the next day met with that much less resistance. Orchard Knob also became General Grant's headquarters during the remaining days of the fighting at Chattanooga.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On November 24th General Hooker carried Lookout Mountain and drove the Confederates back onto Missionary Ridge.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The 25th found General Sherman in position and the attempt was made to roll up the Confederate right, but in vain, no progress was made. The repeated assaults were seen by the officers grouped on Orchard Knob and between two and three o'clock in the afternoon it was apparent that no progress was being made.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As the events which followed immediately after are much mooted, a short extract written by General Wood himself is of importance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in .5in 8.0pt .5in;">"At the moment when it became evident General Sherman was making no progress I chanced to be standing near General Grant. He turned to me and remarked in substance, 'General Sherman is meeting with very heavy opposition, and we must do something for his relief.' I replied: 'it seems he is being roughly handled, and we ought to do all we can to aid him.' General Grant then went on to say: 'I think if we advance and take the rifle-pits opposite our front at the base of Missionary Ridge, the movement will so menace Bragg's centre on the crest that he will withdraw force enough from Sherman's front to permit him to carry his point of attack.' To this I simply expressed coincidence of opinion, and added my confidence that we could readily carry the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Doubtless this brief colloquy was the result, in chief part, of the mere accident of my standing near to General Grant at the moment, when all observers on Orchard Knob perceived that General Sherman was, to say the least, making no progress. The conversation may have been induced, in part, by the freedom of intercourse due to a long acquaintance, which had its origin when General Grant and myself were cadets at the Military Academy. These suggestions seem to be necessary to prevent the slightest suspicion that I would convey the impression that General Grant formally consulted me or desired my opinion touching any movement of troops he chose to order.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The incident of the convesation is, however, most interesting, in a historical point of view, as showing most clearly and most accurately what movement, and the purpose thereof, General Grant desired to have made by the centre of the Army of the Cumberland at that particular hour of the 25th. It further shows conclusively that an assault on the crest of Missionary Ridge was not intended to be a part of that particular movement, however much General Grant may have intended that such an assault should be subsequently made.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The incident of this conversation possesses a further historic interest and importance. Historians have called the movement ordered by General Grant against the Confederate intrenchments at the base of Missionary Ridge a radical departure from his original and admirably conceived plan of battle. It is respectfully suggested that the conversation demonstrates conclusively that the effort to carry the Confederate rifle-pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, so far from being a radical departure from the original plan of battle, was intended to be simply auxilliary to the dominant and ruling attack of the original plan. As has been more than once remarked in the course of this paper, the plan of battle was admirable. General Grant had wisely intrusted the execution of the dominant attack to his ablest, most brilliant, most distinguished, and by far most highly trusted Lieutenant, General Sherman; and he clung to his original plan with the unyielding tenacity of purpose for which he is so justly proverbial. Every consideration influenced and swayed him to this course. If his original plan could be successfully executed the result would be probably more prolific than could possibly be realized from any other issue of events. Professional pride must naturally and not improperly have urged General Grant to adhere to his original plan of battle. Regard for the fame and feelings of the trusted subordinates-yes, more than his trusted subordinate, his Fidus Achates-to whom he had committed the execution of the ruling feature of his plan of battle, solicited in the most urgent terms that no stone should be left unturned which would inure to the success of the original plan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the matchless "Psalm of Life" we are eloquently urged to</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">"Be not like dumb driven cattle,"</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">by the current of events.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With the usual license assumed and in fact allowed to poets, this advice is all very well, but it is modestly suggested that in the prosiac affairs of every-day practical life-more especially in the stern dealings of military life, the poet's counsel won't work. Events are wont to be stronger than any man's tenacity of purpose-however tenacious and persistent that may be. "L'homme propose, et Dieu dispose." The manner in which the event was finally decided at Missionary Ridge was no exception to the rule contained in the old French saw. The Commanding General willed to decide the issue in one way-the rank and file decided the issue in another and entirely different way.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The brief conversation given above scarcely occupied a minute. General Grant walked directly from me to General Thomas, who was standing a few paces distant, and a short talk occurred between them. I was not standing sufficiently near to hear what passed between them, but of course was satisfied they were conversing about the movement against the Confederate intrenchments at the base of the ridge, or perhaps I should more properly write, General Grant was communicating to General Thomas his desire to have the movement made.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Thomas called General Granger, commanding the Fourth Corps to him and gave him some directions. General Granger came immediately to me and said substantially, "we are ordered by General Grant to take the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge, and there halt. Get your division ready to move as soon as you can." He added, "I will send the order to General Sheridan, and the two divisions will move together."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Rapidly the divisions moved forward, and with a resistless sweep carried the intrenchments at the foot of the ridge. With the goal attained, the orders under which the men were acting were carried out to the letter.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Then followed perhaps the grandest display of daring enthusiasm to be found in the pages of the Civil War. Without orders the men took the initiative and pressed on up the hill. They were thinking soldiers, those Americans; they could not stay at the bottom of the ridge under the fire of fifty cannon, they would not go back and the only alternative was to advance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Back on Orchard Knob this advance was seen with surprise and General Grant turned to General Thomas and asked if he had ordered the advance to the crest and on his answering in the negative, the same question was asked of General Granger, the corps commander and the same answer elicited. Then General Joseph Fullerton, General Granger's chief of staff, was sent to Generals Wood and Sheridan to find out if they had ordered the assault on the crest of the ridge and General Wood's answer was that the men had started up without orders and that he would like to know who could stop them, but further said that if they were supported they could carry the ridge.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">His prophecy soon came true. Nearer and nearer the crest climbed the line in blue, but no more a line-a series of angles, each angle marked by the battle-flag of a regiment carried by the strongest men, for each one was striving to be the first to plant its colors in the Confederate lines. Almost simultaneously the ridge was gained at half a dozen points and the soldiers' assault of Missionary ridge became one of the marvels of the war. General Wood always claimed that the troops of his division were the first to gain the crest of the ridge, basing his assertion on the fact that while Sheridan's division was halted at the foot of the ridge and that part of it which had started up the ridge was recalled, his (i. e. Wood's) division never stopped its advance from the time it left Orchard Knob until the crest was gained. Testimony from the enemy who takes no interest in his adversary's contention is therefore valuable and the Confederate reports confirm General Wood's claim.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Bragg reported that the first break occurred in the left of Anderson's division which opposed Willich's and Hazen's brigades of Wood's division. General Bate, whose division confronted Sheridan's in his official report says that the Confederate line was first pierced in Anderson's division and that he sent re-inforcements to this point, having checked the attack on his front, i. e. Sheridan's division. Along the magnificent crest road laid out by the Government on Missionary Ridge are scattered tablets and markers representing both National and Confederate organizations. Between the two guns which indicate the position of Garrity's Alabama Battery is the battery tablet on which, recounting the services of the battery is said: "this was the first point in the line carried by the enemy." This is the Confederate testimony and the interesting question at once arises, what National troops were engaged at this point?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Many northern states have erected markers along the Crest Road to indicate the positions where their different regiments made the ascent of the ridge and these markers answer the question asked above.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Twenty feet on one side of the Alabama Battery we find the tablet showing where the 49th Ohio gained the crest, thirty feet on the other side stands the stone marker of the 89th Illinois, just beyond the bronze tablet of the 15th Ohio and but a short distance away Kansas has erected a handsome monument to her 8th regiment, all these regiments being on the right of Willich's brigade, Wood's division.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Confederates have answered this long mooted question, the men of the right of Willich's brigade and of the left of Hazen's brigade, both belonging to Wood's division, first gained the crest of Missionary Ridge.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The following brief extract from an account written at the time gives some little idea of the enthusiasm of both officers and men.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in .5in 8.0pt .5in;">"It was near sundown when General T. J. Wood, whose conduct all through the three day's battle, marked him as one of the ablest leaders of the National Armies, rode along the lines of his superb division. Loud shouts of enthusiasm everywhere greeted his appearance, until at last his feelings, no longer controllable, broke forth in a speech.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in .5in 8.0pt .5in;">"Brave men!" said he, "you were ordered to go forward and take the rebel rifle-pits at the foot of these hills; you did so; and by the Eternal! without orders, you pushed forward and took all the enemy's works on top! Here is a fine chance for having you all court martialed, and I myself will appear as the principal witness against you, unless you promise me one thing."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">"What is it? What is it?" Laughingly inquired the men.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in .5in 8.0pt .5in;">"It is," resumed the General, "that as you are now in possession of these works, you will continue, against all opposition of Bragg, Johnston, Jeff. Davis and the devil, steadfastly to hold them!"</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At the conclusion of this speech, the enthusiasm of the soldiers knew no bounds; they left the ranks and crowded around the General. "We promise! We promise!" They cried; and amid such exclamations as: "Of course we'll hold them!" "Let any try to take them from us!" "Bully for you!" "Three cheers for old Wood!" the gallant officer rode off the field.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Grant's hands being freed by the victory of Missionary Ridge, he at once sent a force into Eastern Tennessee to the relief of Knoxville which was beleagured by Longstreet. The movement was successful and Longstreet fell back without seriously opposing the relief column. General Wood's division took part in the movement and while no opportunity was given him to show his fighting ability, still he displayed to the utmost his ability to take care of his troops. The weather was terrific in Eastern Tennessee, the troops bivouacing with the thermometer 10 degrees below zero and supplies of all kinds were short. Wood's division was so well supplied that another prominent division commander tried to have an order issued from Corps Headquarters directing General Wood to give him shoes. It is needless to say that the order was not issued.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">May, '64, marked the beginning of the great campaigns East and West that were to finally crush the Rebellion and the opening of the campaign found General Wood in command of the 3rd Division, 4th Army Corps.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is impossible to give a detailed statement of the work done by General Wood's division during the long battle summer of 1864; a brief synopsis must therefore suffice.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the opening manoeuvres of the campaign in the neighborhood of Dalton, where the Confederate Army was nearly cut off, General Wood was engaged in the action at Rocky Face Ridge.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the next stage of the campaign his division took part in the Battles of Resaca, May 14-15, and action at Adairsville on May 17th.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">After being engaged in the Battle of New Hope Church, May 25-26, General Wood's division was ordered to find the extreme right of the enemy's position, turn it and attack him in flank. In the dense woods of Northern Georgia this was no easy task and it was 4:30 P. M. before the enemy could be located and the column formed for the attack. General Wood had made a personal reconnaissance of the possition and protested against the assault, stating that it could not succeed, but his protest was over-ruled and he at once ordered his brigade commanders to "go in like the D--- was after you." The result proved the wisdom of General Wood's protest. Charge after charge was made, at one point the troops reaching the line of Confederate intrenchments, but all in vain; inside of two hours 1457 men had been killed and wounded in this one division.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Wood also took part in the various engagements about Pine and Kenesaw Mountains and was in support of the attacking column in the assault on Kenesaw on June 27th, but the complete failure of the leading division in the assault prevented his being heavily engaged.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On July 19th, General Wood's division by a very brilliant movement forced the crossing of Peach Tree Creek and threw a bridge across the stream in the presence of the enemy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During the siege of Atlanta, Wood's division occupied a line of works near Peach Tree Creek until it took part in the swinging movement to the south which caused the evacuation of Atlanta by the Confederates.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During this movement General Wood was engaged in the battles of Jonesboro, August 31, September I, and Lovejoy Station, September 2nd. In this last engagement while personally superintending an attack by two of his brigades he was struck down by a riflle-shot which passed through his left foot.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Atlanta was immediately evacuated by the Confederates and the campaign which had begun four'months before at Chattanooga was brought to a successful termination.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Although suffering from a painful wound General Wood refused to give up his command and be sent North on sickleave. Dr. Cooper, the Medical Director of the Army of the Cumberland, told him that it would cost him his leg and jokingly threatened to have him put under arrest and sent to the rear, but General Wood persisted and gained his point. The good effect that it had upon the Army may be seen from the remark that General Sherman made that it was worth 20,000 men to him because it made it so easy to refuse all other applications for leave.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A very distinguished officer of the Army of the Cumberland in a recent letter said: "This is no new incident to me for I observed it during the Nashville campaign, and have frequently since then called attention to the stoic fortitude which he displayed. It was as gallant a performance as was Upton's at Winchester where he was wounded by a fragment of shell in the leg and so badly hurt that Sheridan ordered him to the rear. He declined and after putting a tourniquet on his leg was carried about the field on a stretcher till the battle was won. The examples of Wood and Upton are amongst the most notable incidents.of the kind presented by our war or by any other, so far as I know</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Surely the man who at Stone River although severely wounded never dismounted from his horse or had the wound dressed until the fighting was over, and who again disabled by the enemy's bullet, refused to take sick leave and fought a winter's campaign a cripple, must have had a sense of duty and devotion to his cause that is seldom found on history's pages.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Soon General Sherman started South on his famous march to the sea, and General Thomas prepared to gather his scattered troops to repel Hood's advance into Tennessee.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Still crippled, with his foot bound up in an old buffalo robe, because he-could not wear'a boot, and with an orderly riding beside him carrying his crutches, Thomas J. Wood entered into his last campaign.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">After that wonderful march past the Confederate lines at Spring Hill, the 4th and 23rd Corps repelled Hood's fiercest attack at Franklin, November 30th, and fell back safely to Nashville. General Wood was not heavily engaged at Franklin and General Stanley being wounded there, General Wood succeeded to the command of the 4th Corps.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Through those days at Nashville when the noble Thomas was harassed nigh unto death by orders, telegrams urging him to assault, but as steadfast then as when he stood on Snodgrass Hill "the Rock of Chickamauga" refused to advance until he was ready though it nearly cost him his command. Thomas J. Wood was his special confidant and friend; no two men had been so closely connected with the Army of the Cumberland from the first to the last as George H. Thomas and Thomas J. Wood, and it was peculiarly fitting in these last glorious days, that one should have command of the Army and the other of the 4th Army Corps, veterans ,of every battle from Mill Springs to Nashville. 'But finally the thaw came, the ice melted and Thomas was ready to fight. The evening before the battle General Thomas called a council of war at his headquarters and Chaplain Van Home in his Life of Thomas says: "In this meeting at Nashville, General Wood proposed a plan, which General Thomas said would be adopted with some added details."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On December I5th, Thomas launched his attack against Hood strongly posted on the hills near Nashville and the evening of the I6th found the Confederate Army of the Tennessee that for four years had opposed the Army of the Cumberland scattered and put to rout by its old time adversary.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Yes, Nashville was the crowning victory of the Army of the Cumberland and in it General Wood displayed to the utmost his ability as a soldier. The opening assault on the first day was made by his old division of the 4th Corps and the most severe loss was suffered by this corps in the two days' fighting. The pursuit of Hood's forces was entrusted to General Wilson, commanding the Cavalry and General Wood with the 4th Corps. In most inclement weather the National troops pressed forward in the pursuit. Every bridge had been burned by the Confederates and it was necessary to improvise bridges with rafters taken from houses, fence rails, etc. It was continued for over a hundred miles until the Confederates had crossed the Tennessee river and taken up their bridge. Had the gunboats under Commodore Lee on the river done their duty Hood's entire army would have been captured.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In January, 1865, General Wood was appointed Major General of Volunteers, an honor won long before but tradily granted. After Stone River, Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge it would have been most fitting, after Nashville it seemed almost too late.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During the winter and spring of '65, the 4th Corps was stationed in Eastern Tennessee guarding the passes of the mountains against a possible attempt of General Lee's to escape to the West.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">After General Lee's surrender the 4th Corps was sent to Texas in the summer of I865, as a menace to Maximilian and his French allies. General Wood participated in these different movements until September, '65, when he was placed in command of the Central District of Arkansas.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The period of reconstruction was now on and its problems seemed as difficult of solution as those of the war itself. General Thomas was in command of the Division of the Tennessee and at his request General Wood was brought from Arkansas and placed in command of the Department of Mississippi. General Wood found the condition of affairs in his department most deplorable but with the same industry and zeal which he had displayed in the field he labored first to gain the confidence of the people of Mississippi and then that confidence gained, to restore the shattered fabric of civil life both in government and in business. That he succeeded the record shows, but perhaps the most touching proof of the good work that Thomas J. Wood did in Mississippi is found in the following incident.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">After his death in February, I906, just forty years after he had labored for the people of Mississippi, the Vicksburg Herald, the leading paper in the State, published the follow. ing editorial:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">"The death of General Thomas J. Wood is a reminder that h'e deserves grateful remembrance.from Mississippi. He succeeded General H. W. Slocum as commander of the military in the state, with headquarters at Vicksburg in September, 1865. In that position, which he held all through I866, duties were devolved upon him which were a severe test of administrative ability and that proved high character as well. Socially, industrially and politically, there prevailed chaos, confusion and uncertainty. In sections there was distress and disorder in the years immediately following war. It can readily be seen that such a situation demanded a military ruler who combined with firmness and fairness, sagacious judgment. The chronicles, and the surviving memories, of the period credit General Wood with proving himself such a commander. In evidence of the fact, and as a tribute to one who was a friend in the very hour of need, the following is reproduced from the Herald files. "Vicksburg, Miss., Dec. I, i866.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Major-General Thomas J. Wood:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The undersigned members of the Grand Jury of the Criminal Court of Warren County for the November term. I866, cannot adjourn without expressing their deep sense of your judicious and important course as Commander of the Department of Mississippi. No interference by the military has prevented the discharge of our duty or that of our civil officers. And we may be permitted to express the hope that the civil judiciary has at least shown itself competent to protect the innocent and punish the guilty, in the opinion of the military authorities. Accept the assurances, General, of our highest consideration.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">HENRY HAMMETT, foreman; M. MURPHY, etc.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Headquarters Dist. of Mississippi. Vicksburg, Miss., Dec. 5, i866.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To Henry Hammett, foreman, and M Murphy and others, members of the Grand Jury of Warren County:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Gentlemen:-For the very kind and complimentary opinion of my military administration in this state, expressed in your card "of the Ist inst. I beg that you will accept my sincere and hearty thanks. I am sure no class of citizens desire more sincerely to see an equal, fair and just administration of impartial laws, through the regularly organized civil channels without the intervention of military authority, than do the officers of our national military establishment. Please accept, gentlemen, the assurance of my high consideration and kind wishes for each one of you singly and the whole collectively.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I am very respectfully Your obedient servant,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">T. J. WOOD, Brev't Major-General</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Can it be denied that this correspondence is a true testimonial of the temper of the people?" In I867, General Wood was relieved from the command of the District of Mississippi and mustered out of the Volunteer service.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">He rejoined his regiment, the 2nd Cavalry, at Fort McPherson but soon found that the wounds and injuries of the Civil War had incapacitated him from further active service and he was placed on the Retired List with the rank of Major General.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">From the time of his retirement General Wood made his home in Dayton, Ohio, the native town of his wife.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Quietly and peacefully the veteran soldier passed these last years, believing that an officer of the Army should live up to the highest ideals, he never permitted anything to conflict with what he thought was his duty.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Perhaps his greatest pleasure was found in the love and devotion of the soldiers who had served under him and with him which was manifested in many ways and he was always a prominent figure in the meetings of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In I892, he assisted in marking the lines at Chickamauga Park and was always most enthusiastic over all things that tended to perpetuate the deeds of the brave men of the Civil War, whether they wore the blue or the gray. In the same year a dinner of the surviving members of the Class of 1845 was held in New York, only six were left, W. F. Smith, T. J. Wood, Fitz-John Porter, Henry Coppee, J. P. Hatch and E. K. Smith. A sad but sweet meeting and Thomas J. Wood voiced it when he gave as his toast those beautiful lines of Moore's:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">"Long days have passed, old friend, since we</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">First met in life's young day, And friends long loved by thee and me</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Since then have dropped away. But enough remain to cheer us on</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">And sweeten, when thus we're met, The glass we fill to the many gone</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">And the few who are left us yet."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In I895, General Wood was appointed a member of the Board of Visitors at West Point by President Cleveland, a very appropriate appointment as it marked the fiftieth anniversary of his graduation from the Academy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When the Spanish-American War broke out, General Wood, though long past the age limit, volunteered his services to the War Department.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In I902, General Wood attended the hundredth anniversary of the Military Academy at West Point and responded for the Mexican War. Then in his eightieth year but full of vigor and life, he enjoyed .to the uttermost that brilliant occasion.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During the next three or four years his health gradually gave way and, although he fought his grim adversary as valiantly as he had on the slope of Snodgrass Hill, the victory could not be his.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At last on a peaceful Sunday afternoon that gallant soul quietly passed away, a brave soldier had gone over the river to join his comrades of the days of yore. Years before General Wood had expressed a desire to be buried in the cemetery at West Point and in conformity with that wish his body was interred on the beautiful banks of the Hudson which he had loved for sixty years. Possibly a premonition may have prompted General Wood in the closing paragraph of his speech at West Point at the celebration, at all events, it was the peroration of his last speech and 'twill serve to close this poor memorial of a noble life.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">"And now, since the graduates of the decade of the forties are not likely to meet with you again, I bid you a last farewell, and with it this benediction, a true heritage of the old Academy which we love so well. "When you and I and Benny, and General Jackson, too, Are brought before the final board our course in life to view, May we never 'fess' on any point, but then be told to go To join the army of the blest and Benny Havens oh."<span style="font-size: 12pt;">; </span></p>
<p><a href="https://usmalibrary.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/aogreunion/id/8468">1906 AR 1906</a></p>
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